

S E C R E T

APPENDIX B

"London" Draft  
of the  
TPAJAX Operational Plan

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"LONDON" DRAFT OF THE TPAJAX OPERATIONAL PLANI. INTRODUCTION

The policy of both the US and UK governments requires replacement of Mossadeq as the alternative to certain economic collapse in Iran and the eventual loss of the area to the Soviet orbit. Only through a planned and controlled replacement can the integrity and independence of the country be ensured.

General Zahedi is the only figure in Iran currently capable of heading a new government who could be relied upon to repress Soviet-Communist penetration and carry out basic reforms.

The plan which follows is comprised of three successive stages. The first two stages precede action of a military nature. They include the present preliminary support period and the mass propaganda campaign. (See paragraphs below.) These stages will be of real value to the mutual interests of US and UK even if final military action is not carried out in that they will make the position of Mossadeq increasingly vulnerable and unsteady.

The total estimated expenditure required to implement this plan will be the equivalent of \$285,000 of which \$147,500 will be provided by the US Service and \$137,500 by the UK Service.

I. OPERATIONAL PLANA. Preliminary Support of Opposition to Mossadeq Government

For a period of several months both the US field station and the British group (the Rashidian brothers) have been in close touch with Zahedi. The British group has supplied the equivalent of \$50,000 (four to five million rials) for this support.

During this preliminary period beginning 1 June 1953, and for an estimated two months maximum thereafter, the United States will provide \$35,000 and the United Kingdom the equivalent of \$25,000. Initial payments under this allocation have already been made by the US field station.

British funds will continue to be paid through present channels for purposes as directed by the UK or by the US field station on UK behalf.

US funds are to be distributed through direct US field station contacts for the specific purpose of extending and strengthening military and political contacts of Zahedi.

Early in this period Zahedi will be made fully aware of this dual support and of the joint intention that it should lead to even more concrete support.

During this period the impression will continue to be given in the circle of Zahedi's contacts that the Shah

is supporting him by the provision of funds.

The coordination of UK-US field station activity on the developing plan will be achieved through direct contact between US field personnel and the British group with the former acting on behalf of the United Kingdom by relaying instructions and acting as a secure communications link, to augment that already existing.

Appropriate steps will be taken to ensure that overt US policy will conform as closely as possible with the purpose of this plan.

B. Role of the Shah as Focal Point of Opposition

This plan is based on the assumption that the cooperation of the Shah will be obtained. Such cooperation will give a military coup the best chance of success. However, it also envisages the same type of operation through the involuntary involvement of the Shah in this plan.

To play his role the Shah requires special preparation. By nature a creature of indecision, beset by formless doubts and fears, he must be induced to play his role, and this role must require a minimum of affirmative action and cover as brief a period as possible.

We consider Princess Ashraf, his forceful and scheming twin sister, to be the person most likely to be able to

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induce the Shah to play his role. We are certain that Ashraf will eagerly cooperate to bring about the fall of Mossadeq. Therefore, Ashraf must be approached at her present location, briefed on the task and sent back to Iran. Contact will have to be maintained between Ashraf and the US field station.

The role of the Shah is to be played in three stages, and Ashraf will be preparing him in advance for each successive stage. The first stage will be to convince the Shah that the United States and the United Kingdom have a joint aim in Iran, and at the same time to remove his pathological fear of the "hidden UK hand"; the second stage will be to inform him in specific terms of what the immediate future holds for him. The third stage will be to obtain specific items from him. These stages are detailed below:

1. First Stage:

With prior advice from Princess Ashraf, the leader of the British group will visit the Shah to assure him that the United States and the United Kingdom have common aims towards Iran, and that both want to support him to the utmost in opposing Mossadeq. The leader of the British group will say that he is in a position to prove that the British are supporting the Shah and

that he, the leader, is authorized to speak for the United Kingdom by stating that any key phrase selected by the Shah out of several proposed will be given on successive dates in the Persian language broadcasts over the BBC.

2. Second Stage:

With advance warning from Princess Ashraf, General Schwarzkopf (former head of the US Military Mission to the Iranian Gendarmerie) is introduced as the US special representative. This representative is already well known to and admired by the Shah as a result of his successful tour of duty in Iran some years ago.

His remarks to the Shah will comprise two parts.

The first part covers the following points:

- a. Both governments consider the oil issue of secondary importance at this time, since the major issue is the resolve of both governments to maintain the independence of Iran. Both governments are now determined to help the Iranians to help themselves to keep their country from falling into Soviet hands. If Mossadeq remains in power economic collapse is certain, and since Mossadeq is permitting extensive Communist penetration, the economic collapse would be followed by a Communist takeover of the country.

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b. Both governments feel that the continued existence of the Pahlevi dynasty should be the best bulwark of national sovereignty.

c. As long as Mossadeq is in power the country will get no new financial aid from the United States and indeed present aid may be slashed.

d. Mossadeq must go.

e. His successor will have the strong support of both governments through the same forces that bring him into power.

f. An acceptable oil settlement will be offered, but there is no intention of either rushing this issue or of forcing it on the country.

The second part will cover the following points:

a. The Shah is now, and inevitably will remain, the focal point of all forces opposing Mossadeq.

b. If the Shah fails to go along with these forces he will be solely responsible for the collapse of the country and its loss of independence.

c. If the Shah fails to go along his dynasty is bound to come to an end soon. In spite of the Shah's previous misconceptions, the United States and the United Kingdom have been and are supporting him, but if the Shah fails now, this support will be



withdrawn. The representative will discuss the implications of this.

d. The Shah has stated that Zahedi is acceptable to him as a successor to Mossadeq. Furthermore, the Shah has asked that funds for Zahedi's support given by the United States and United Kingdom governments should be given out in his name.

e. The US and UK governments agree fully that Zahedi is the only effective candidate. Zahedi will be ready to take over in the near future, aided in every way to achieve success by the United States and United Kingdom. The Shah will be kept fully informed of Zahedi's plans and a minimum of action will be required from him. As soon as possible after the visit of the US representative to the Shah, the leader of the British group will make a visit of identical type to reinforce the above statements.

3. Third Stage:

This stage will be the sole responsibility of Princess Ashraf. Immediately following the visits as described above and while the Shah is still under their effects Princess Ashraf will obtain his signature on three documents. The first of these documents will be

dated, the second and the third undated.

They will be:

- a. An open letter calling on all loyal officers to cooperate with the bearer of the letter in any efforts he feels are necessary to reestablish the prestige of the Army, to restore their own self respect and to show their devotion to the Shah and country.
- b. A royal decree naming Zahedi as Chief of Staff.
- c. A royal decree appealing to all ranks of the Army to carry out faithfully the orders of the Chief of Staff whom the Shah has named.

These documents will then be taken out of the palace at once; the first to be delivered to Zahedi and the other two to be held by the US station against time of need.

Following the effort required of him to produce these documents the Shah may be in a period of elation for some time. Sooner or later he will begin to brood and to doubt, and at this time he must be removed from the capital to make some kind of tour. Preferably he would make a religious retreat to the Meshed shrine. He would remain at this shrine until after Zahedi obtains control and would return to the capital only to give his official

approval to the new Prime Minister.

C. Arrangement with Zahedi

Continuing contacts by US personnel and British agents with Zahedi or his representatives have helped to bring into increasingly clear focus the picture of his tentative plans and of those elements from which he expects support. This material and related intelligence reports have been used in the preparation of later paragraphs which follow under the subtitle "Organization to mount coup," with its supporting material in the annexes.

Following the phased contacts with the Shah as given above, both the United States and the United Kingdom will inform Zahedi directly that they have secured a firm commitment from the Shah on his behalf and that the time has come to move to a detailed plan of action.

General Zahedi will be given the letter signed by the Shah calling on all loyal officers to cooperate with the bearer. He will be instructed to recruit, with the aid of this letter, military aides. Zahedi will also be shown the US-UK proposal for action entitled "Organization to overthrow Mossadeq." It will be discussed with Zahedi who will have the opportunity to amend or modify this proposal should this be necessary to meet his desires and

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capabilities. It will be pointed out to Zahedi that the plan provides for full US-UK coordinated covert support prior to the time of the coup. Every element of the potential opposition to Mossadeq will be mustered so that on coup day it may be possible to overthrow the Mossadeq government by legal means. It will be pointed out to Zahedi that the future character and reputation of the successor government would be better if military action could be limited to assuring control of the city coincident with this legal success.

However, should the Shah fail to go along with the US representative or fail to produce the documents for General Zahedi, Zahedi would be informed that the United States and United Kingdom would be ready to go ahead without the Shah's active cooperation if Zahedi agrees. We would continue to make every effort to associate the Shah with the undertaking involuntarily and so hope to achieve the same result as if he had actively participated.

D. Organization to Mount Overthrow

The material which follows under this heading is that which is to be presented to Zahedi by the US field station for the purpose of discussion and modification.

Under the headings which follow, elements of existing

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or potential strength are assigned their specific roles. This approach omits any consideration of the strength of the pro-Mossadeq forces.

1. Organization to Mount Coup

a. Military secretariat. This secretariat, headed by an officer named by Zahedi but acceptable to the United States and United Kingdom will be composed of a very limited number of capable senior officers. This secretariat will be in contact with the US field station which will hand over a preliminary staff plan jointly prepared by the United States and the United Kingdom for securing Tehran. A sum equivalent to \$75,000 will be required for the military secretariat to carry out its functions.

b. Duties of the secretariat. Its most urgent duty will be the selection of key officers in Tehran who can be counted upon or won over for action against the Mossadeq government. For security reasons, such officers will be informed of their own actual role at the latest possible date.

This secretariat will make a detailed examination of the US and the UK staff plan with special attention to every action to be carried out on coup day. Some of these actions will be immediate seizure of general

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staff headquarters, army radio station, Radio Tehran, the houses of Mossadeq and his entourage, police and gendarmerie headquarters, post and telegraph offices, telephone exchange, the Majlis and its printing press, and the National Bank and its printing press. Arrests will include the key figures of the Mossadeq government, key army officers cooperating with Mossadeq, and selected newspaper editors.

Special attention will also be given to preparing measures to be taken against the Tudeh Party. Zahedi must expect a violent reaction from the Tudeh Party, and must be fully prepared to meet it with superior violence. There is no possibility of neutralizing the party until after the Mossadeq government has been replaced. However, there will be a breathing spell of several hours after the change of government before the Tudeh Party will be able to get out on the streets in force. At the time of the coup at least 100 party and front group leaders and journalists must be arrested: these names will come from a list of approximately 80 such leaders recently prepared by the United Kingdom, plus US station additions, plus Zahedi's own additions. Control of the Tehran streets will prevent the massing of Tudeh or other mob elements. Mass distribution of

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black pamphlets, notionally issued by the Central Committee of the Party, will be made with the purpose of confusing Tudeh members and of preventing them from assembling in an effective manner. It may be possible for the United States to supply by air in advance stocks of tear gas, indelible ink, or other materials suitable for the control of mobs. Local air force planes may drop warnings to the public to stay off the streets or take the consequences.

c. Action on coup day. This action will follow basically similar lines although it may be carried out relative to as many as three different situations. These three situations are:

Situation A: The climax of a massive religious protest against the Mossadeq government which is followed immediately by military action.

Situation B: The moment when the Shah is being forced by Mossadeq to leave the country. This action by Mossadeq will have resulted from either the growing strength of the opposition as knowingly led by the Shah or because of its growing strength with the Shah as its involuntary figurehead.

Situation C: The moment when Mossadeq attempts to present his resignation. Such an action might result



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from his real concern over the growing strength of the opposition and might take the form, on past showing, of calling on the Shah for personal support. Failing to win the support of the Shah he might summon the mobs into the streets.

Action to be taken with regard to Situation A will be as follows:

At the climax of Situation A, Zahedi will assume office as Chief of the General Staff by a limited military action against the headquarters of the general staff. He will at once name the selected person as his deputy, and the arrests of Mossadeq and the others will be made at once. The Majlis will be called into session and the opposition will attempt to pass a vote of censure against Mossadeq, and will follow this with a vote of support for Zahedi. However, with or without the possession of a royal decree naming him as prime minister, Zahedi will take over the government and will execute the various requirements of coup day (see above). Once he has firmly established his control, he will have no trouble in obtaining the formal vote of support from the Majlis. Only then will the Shah return to Tehran.

Action to be taken with regard to Situations B and C will be as follows:



The only change in plan will be the necessary advancement of the timetable for coup day to the day of actual crisis and the necessity of putting all the military aspects of the coup machinery into operation at once.

2. Organization to Create a Maximum Public Opposition to Mossadeq Prior to Coup

a. General Program. The purpose will be to create, extend, and enhance public hostility and distrust and fear of Mossadeq and his government. A sum equivalent to \$150,000 will be budgeted for this program. This will be a phased operation, with the phases as follows:

Phase 1. This is the current preliminary support stage wherein the receipt of US and UK funds permits Zahedi to win additional friends and to influence key people.

Phase 2. A massive propaganda campaign against Mossadeq and his government but with Mossadeq himself as the principal target. This will begin only a week or two before the climax of Situation A so as not to offer too much time for a sharp reaction by Mossadeq and so that the impact will not be dispersed by being long drawn out.

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Phase 3. This is Situation A which is described in full in a following paragraph.

b. Duties of Specific Elements

(1) Press and publicity. In the preliminary support period the British group will continue to use its numerous smaller papers to push an anti-Mossadeq line. At Headquarters and at the field station US personnel will draft and put into Persian the texts for articles, broadsheets and pamphlets, some pro-Shah and some anti-Mossadeq. The material designed to discredit Mossadeq will hammer the following themes:

(a) Mossadeq favors the Tudeh Party and the USSR. (This will be supported by black documents.)

(b) Mossadeq is an enemy of Islam since he associates with the Tudeh and advances their aims.

(c) Mossadeq is deliberately destroying the morale of the Army and its ability to maintain order.

(d) Mossadeq is deliberately fostering the growth of regional separatist elements through his removal of Army control over

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tribal areas. One of the aims of the removal of control by the Army is to make it easier for the Soviets to take over the Northern Provinces.

(e) Mossadeq is deliberately leading the country into economic collapse.

(f) Mossadeq has been corrupted by power to such an extent that no trace is left of the fine man of earlier years, and he now has all the repressive instincts of the dictator.

(g) Consistent with these themes will be the persistent slant that Mossadeq has been the unwitting victim of his unscrupulous, personally ambitious advisers.

It is considered essential that Zahedi make an early choice of the man who will be his director of press and propaganda and who may be deputy prime minister as well. The US field station will obtain from Zahedi the name of the man he has in mind who must be acceptable to the United States and the United Kingdom. One or two weeks before the date set for Situation A, the intensive propaganda effort will begin. The details relative

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to the execution of this campaign will be the primary responsibility of the US field station.

Immediately after the change of government, Zahedi's director of press and propaganda must be prepared to:

(a) Make maximum use of Radio Tehran.

(b) Through Radio Tehran, posters, special news sheets, etc. spread the program of the new government, including elements of broadcast appeal presented in simplest terms, such as immediate slashes in living costs, increased pay for government officials and Army personnel, etc.

(c) Give maximum local publicity to US and UK statements which will have been prepared in advance.

(d) Brief all foreign correspondents.

(2) The Majlis. If the Majlis is in session at the time of the coup, an effort will be made to have the change of government formalized. If it is not in session it will be called into session by one of its elected officers who will have to be a member of the anti-Mossadeq opposition.

To prepare for the change of government, a

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number of the deputies will be approached and purchased. It is yet to be decided whether the purchases are to be made by the British group or directly by Zahedi himself who, as long as he enjoys the sanctuary of the Majlis building, is in an excellent position to achieve such an aim. Following the receipt from one or both of the above elements of a list of deputies with the amounts required for the purchase of each one, a special funding operation will be established within the framework of the joint authorization for the execution of this plan. The US field station will also employ various agents and contacts to support this operation.

Its basic aim will be to secure a majority plus one vote against Mossadeq as required in Situation A. At the present time it is estimated that at least 30 deputies are prepared to vote against Mossadeq if they think there is a good chance that they will be in a majority. It is to be noted that all Majlis elected members would not normally be present at any one session. However, it will also be necessary to attempt to ensure that a quorum can be

maintained in the Majlis at the moment when the anti-Mossadeq vote is to be taken. The minimum quorum requirement is that two-thirds of the deputies present in Tehran must be in the Chamber before a vote can be taken. Thus an effort will be made to purchase additional deputies solely to have them remain in the Chamber to ensure the quorum and not for the more sensitive role of voting against Mossadeq.

(3) Political elements other than the Tudeh.

Political parties or groups now opposed to Mossadeq will play only a very minor role in this campaign. Such parties as the Toilers Party, the Sumka and sections of the Pan-Iranists could supply only limited and probably ineffectual street gangs. The Toilers Party will, however, play a fairly important role in the publicity described above.

It is to be noted that while these parties command only ineffectual street gangs, the British group can muster up to approximately 3,000 street activists to be committed in Situation A.

(4) Religious leaders. It is our belief that nearly all the important religious leaders with large followings are firmly opposed to Mossadeq.

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Both the US field station and the British group have firm contacts with such leaders. The pro-Zahedi capabilities in this field are very great.

These leaders include such assorted and sometimes inimical elements as the non-political leaders and , as well as and and his terrorist gang,

. During the period of intensive anti-Mossadeq publicity before coup day the leaders and their henchmen will:

(a) Spread word of their disapproval of Mossadeq.

(b) Give open support to the symbol of the throne and give moral backing to the Shah through direct contact with him at the shrine.

(c) As required, stage small pro-religious anti-Mossadeq demonstrations in widely scattered sections of Tehran.

(d) The terrorist group to threaten that they are ready to take direct action against pro-Mossadeq deputies and members of Mossadeq's entourage and government.

(e) Ensure full participation of themselves

and followers in Situation A.

(f) After the change of government, give the strongest assurances over Radio Tehran and in the mosques that the new government is faithful to religious principles.

(5) Bazaar Merchants. These are defined as a relatively small number of long established prominent merchants with a semi-religious outlook and with strong influence over the lower social orders in the bazaar section. Contacts with these merchants exist both through the British group and through the US field station.

These merchants are anti-Mossadeq because the government harms them directly through the stagnation of business, the cutting off of imports, the strenuous collection of taxes, and the general tightness of money.

In the period of intensive publicity preceding Situation A, these merchants will be used to:

(a) Spread anti-Government rumors in the bazaar.

(b) Stage limited protests in the south of Tehran against the economic policies of the



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Mossadeq government. Then, at the time of Situation A, they will:

(c) Close all or part of the bazaar.

c. Final Action Immediately Preceding the Coup.

As noted above, the military action can result from Situations A, B, or C. However, the pre-coup activities of the organization as described above will be primarily for the purpose of creating Situation A which is described below.

(1) On the appointed day, staged attacks will be made against respected religious leaders in Tehran.

(2) Other religious leaders will at once say that these attacks were ordered by Mossadeq as his reaction to the disfavor in which his government is held by the religious leaders of the entire country.

(3) A number of the more important leaders will at once take sanctuary in the Majlis grounds.

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(4) At this time, these religious leaders will release statements through their followers denouncing in the strongest terms the anti-religious attitude and behavior of Mossadeq.

(5) At the same time as 2.b.(4) (d) above, the fullest publicity will be given to the US station fabricated documents which prove and record in detail a secret agreement between Mossadeq and the Tudeh, with the latter promising to use all their force in support of Mossadeq and against the religious leaders, the Army, and the police.

(6) Simultaneously, these leaders will call on their followers to take sanctuary all over Tehran in mosques, telegraph and post offices, banks, etc. The British group and the US station will supply all the demonstrators they can to swell their ranks, and at the same time the merchants will attempt to close the bazaar. (This mass sanctuary is designed to interrupt all normal life and activity in the city and to illustrate dramatically the extent of popular dissatisfaction with the government. It is the local version of passive resistance

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and by long established tradition the military and police are unable to take action against people who take sanctuary.)

(7) In the presence of this increasingly hostile and abnormal atmosphere, Zahedi will take over as chief of staff and make those arrests which are an essential part of the military phase of the coup.

(8) Just after Zahedi moves, the Majlis will be called into session to formalize the change of government and complete the coup.

II. ESTIMATE OF CHANCES OF SUCCESS OF OPERATIONAL PLAN

The preceding material represents a Western-type plan offered for execution by Orientals. However, it was drafted by authors with an intensive knowledge of the country and its people who endeavored to examine and evaluate all the details from the Iranian point of view. Given the recognized incapacity of Iranians to plan or act in a thoroughly logical manner, we would never expect such a plan to be re-studied and executed in the local atmosphere like a Western staff operation.

However, we feel that the plan is broad enough and sufficiently comprehensive to offer a reasonable chance of success even if not carried out 100 percent.

Security among all local elements involved is a serious weakness inherent in the Persian character. We must be aware of the fact that security breaches might lead to repressive measures by Mossadeq.

No precedent for this proposed operation exists in Iran in recent years. The Reza Shah coup was of an entirely different nature. Recent coups in other Near Eastern countries were far easier to carry out since they were not complicated by a large pro-Communist opposition or hampered by the presence of a head of government having

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powerful popular following.

Prior to an estimate of the chances of success, the following points in connection with the general concept of the coup are vital:

A. The failure of the coup would result in:

1. A strong tide of Government-directed hostility toward the United States and the possibility of the United States being expelled from Iran.

2. Loss to the United Kingdom only of operational machinery represented by the group which is intended mainly for the overthrow of Mossadeq.

B. Should the coup be attempted and fail, but the United States is not expelled from Iran and should Mossadeq then fall at a subsequent date, neither the United States nor the United Kingdom would be in a position to take advantage of that opportunity since the British group and certain US assets may be destroyed by the failure of the coup.

C. If the coup is not undertaken, the United States still stands to be expelled from Iran as the certain economic collapse under the present Mossadeq government would probably be accompanied by internal chaos and a subsequent takeover by the Tudeh under USSR direction.

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D. If the coup plan is rejected at this time, then another plan should be prepared against the time of economic collapse and internal chaos.

Conclusion: Subject to the Shah's support, Zahedi's acceptance of the basic features of this plan, our approval of his modifications, and to our feeling certain that he will act according to an established timetable, the authors of this plan believe that the coup will succeed.

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V. ANNEXES

These proposed annexes are not included in this draft as they must be based upon a great mass of intelligence and information which is still being specifically collected for this purpose.

Annexes would include very detailed listing of all support available or probably available to Zahedi such as names and positions of Army officers backing him, critical examination of the position of the Majlis deputies, appraisal of size and cohesion of religious leaders supporting Zahedi, the proposed cabinet of Zahedi, etc.

[The C.I.A.'s secret history of the 1953 coup in Iran was a nearly 200-page document, comprising the author's own account of the operation and a set of planning documents he attached. The New York Times on the Web is publishing the introduction and many of the planning documents. But the Times decided not to publish the main body of the text after consulting prominent historians who believed there might be serious risk that some of those named as foreign agents would face retribution in Iran.]

Because the introductory summary and the main body of the document are inconsistent on a few dates and facts, readers may note discrepancies between accounts. In its reporting, the Times has relied upon details in the C.I.A. document not published here. In addition, certain names and identifying descriptions have been removed from the documents available on the Web.]

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